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INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance consists of a set of internal procedures, laws, and informal
guidelines that govern how corporate officials make decisions and who bears
responsibility for harms, losses, or injuries that flow from such decisions (Iksander
and Chamlou 2000; Monks and Minow 2004; Thomsen 2008). The objective of the
system is to ensure that corporate decisions are made with the best interests of
the corporation and its stakeholders in mind and that corporate officials speak
truthfully when communicating with investors and the public (Sale 2004).
The principal challenge for corporate governance is to create a system that
holds decision makers accountable while according proper respect to their author-
ity over the corporation. The standard accountability mechanisms are the market,
shareholder voting, and civil and criminal liability. In theory, these mechanisms
work together to create incentives for responsible decision making and to de-
ter self-dealing or other forms of misconduct. In reality, however, each of these
accountability mechanisms contains flaws that allow corporate officials to some-
times exercise an unreasonable degree of discretion when making decisions that
affect the fortunes of so many. When governance systems fail, the impact can be
devastating for investors, employees, and the economy. Recent corporate scandals
and the near-collapse of the global financial system all demonstrate the importance
of maintaining an effective corporate governance regime.
This chapter begins with a description of the principal sources of corporate gov-
ernance standards. It then provides a detailed examination of federal oversight of
financial reporting, and identifies significant problems within the oversight system.
Next, it describes prospective corporate governance reforms proposed in response
to the 2008 financial crisis. The final section offers summaries and conclusions.
SOURCES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE STANDARDS
In the United States, corporate governance standards arise from an amalgam of
state law, federal law, and stock exchange standards, as well as guidelines and
559
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principles devised by private organizations. Together these laws, listing standards,
and informal guidelines create a structure designed to provide accountability for
corporate decision makers.
State Law
The base layer of corporate law rules are set at the state level through statutes
and case-by-case decision making in the common law tradition. Under the internal
affairs doctrine, the law of the state of incorporation governs disputes that arise
between corporate officials, shareholders, or creditors. By choosing a state of in-
corporation, corporate managers select the law that governs the substance of their
relationship with creditors, shareholders, and the state. Delaware has long been
the leading choice for state of incorporation for large publicly traded corporations,
leading many to argue that Delaware has led a race to the bottom in corporate law
(Cary 1974; Nader, Green, and Seligman 1976). Others maintain such competition
has instead created to a race to the top for optimal legal standards in corporate law
(Winter 1977; Romano 1993).
Under state law, a corporation’s directors are charged with managing the
business and affairs of the corporation (Delaware General Corporation Law 2002,
§ 141). Directors delegate this authority to executives who manage the day-to-day
affairs of the firm. Ostensibly, shareholders elect directors at the annual meeting.
As Bebchuk (2007) and others indicate, however, the board of directors tends to be
a self-perpetuating body and shareholders have little practical ability to displace
directors when dissatisfied with their performance.
State corporate statutes provide little guidance regarding a director’s duties.
Instead, the contours of these duties have developed through common law decision
making in courts. Through common law doctrine, courts have established that
directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to their corporations. These obligations
include duties of care, loyalty, candor, and good faith, which require directors
to manage the corporation with diligence and to advance the interests of the
corporation rather than their own (Guth v. Loft 1939).
The shareholder lawsuit is the principal mechanism for enforcing fiduciary
duties. In a derivative lawsuit, shareholders may sue directors or officers on
the corporation’s behalf for breach of fiduciary duty. Shareholders can also sue
directly when they suffer direct harm as a result of directors’ decisions (Clark
1986). But shareholders’ ability to enforce fiduciary duties is hampered by several
formidable doctrinal and procedural hurdles.
First, under the business judgment rule, courts defer to directors’ judgment on
most substantive corporate decisions. Courts focus instead on assessing the process
by which a decision was reached. In Smith v. Van Gorkom (1985), for example, the
directors’ failure to adequately inform themselves before approving a merger led
the court to set aside the business judgment rule and require that the challenged
transaction be assessed for its fairness to the stockholders.
The business judgment rule is also set aside when a conflict of interest exists
between a corporation and its officers or directors, such as when a director stands
on both sides of a transaction. When such a conflict exists, courts will scrutinize the
challenged transaction for fairness. However, statutory and doctrinal rules restore
the business judgment rule when a conflict transaction is approved by disinterested
directors or shareholders (Oberly v. Kirby 1991).
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Recent decisions in Delaware such as In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation
(2006), Stone v. Ritter (2006), and Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan (2009) have elevated
the doctrinal significance of the duty of good faith. After the Delaware Supreme
Court revived a lawsuit against Disney’s directors in 2003, Sale (2004) and Griffith
(2005) speculated that “good faith” might become a tool that judges use to discipline
errant directors, especially during times of scandal. Subsequent Delaware Supreme
Court decisions in Disney, Stone, and Lyondell have undermined the disciplinary
threat that the newly revived “good faith” standard had implied. These more recent
rulings firmly ensconce good faith within the duty of loyalty rubric, making clear
that only sustained dereliction of duty or an act intended to harm the corporation
will lead to personal liability for independent directors (Stone v. Ritter 2006).
Special procedural burdens associated with derivative litigation such as the
demand requirement and special litigation committees further ensure that direc-
tors can avoid liability for errors in judgment or neglect of their duties (Jones
2006). Finally, exculpation, insurance, and indemnification provide additional pro-
tection to corporate officials by covering litigation costs and most judgments and
settlements. The cumulative result of these doctrinal and procedural protections
is that outside directors almost never pay personally for the breach of their du-
ties to shareholders (Black, Cheffins, and Klausner 2006). The absence of an ef-
fective enforcement mechanism for fiduciary duties has led many to conclude
that state corporate law may be best understood as providing merely aspirational
guidelines for how directors should manage a corporation’s affairs (Rock 1997;
Stout 2003).
Federal Securities Law
The federal securities laws provide an important supplement to state corporate
governance standards. These laws require corporations to disclose financial and
other business information to investors and the public on an ongoing basis. Under
the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the 1934 Act), a corporation must provide investors with detailed information
whenever it proposes to sell securities to the public or if its securities trade in a
public market.
Although disclosure rules are the dominant feature of the federal securities
laws, Seligman (2003) and others have pointed out that some of the 1934 Act’s
most significant provisions govern corporate conduct. For example, the conduct of
the shareholder meetings is dictated largely by the requirements of the Exchange
Act and stock exchange listing standards with state law requirements playing
a supporting role. More importantly, many disclosure requirements addressing
compensation, conflicts of interest, and the like are simply regulators’ attempts to
indirectly influence corporate conduct.
Unlike state-based duties that are notoriously difficult to enforce, corporations
and their officials face significant liability for making false or misleading state-
ments to investors or failing to disclose material facts when a duty to disclose
exists. Securities law liability extends to the corporation, its officers and directors,
accountants, underwriters, promoters, and even its attorneys and bankers (Securi-
ties Act of 1933, §§11, 12(a)(2); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section §10(b), Rule
10b-5). All of these officials face the prospect of draconian liability for violating
securities laws.
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Enforcing the Securities Laws
The securities laws are subject to multiple enforcement mechanisms including
private lawsuits, SEC enforcement actions, and criminal prosecutions by the U.S.
Department of Justice. In recent years, state authorities have become more active
in enforcing state securities statutes, introducing another layer of oversight into
the system.
The private class action lawsuit presents the most significant liability threat.
The aggregate value of settlements for securities class action lawsuits reach into
the billions of dollars each year (Ryan and Simmons 2008). The largest settle-
ments involving Enron, WorldCom, and Cendant were $7.1 billion, $6.1 billion,
and $3.5 billion, respectively. In addition to the prospect of astronomical settle-
ments, securities litigation is costly and complex and can consume a dispropor-
tionate amount of management resources and time. These costs and aggravations
have led to concerns about the efficiency and fairness of the shareholder liability
regime.
Alexander (1991), Grundfest (1994), and Pritchard (2008) have all targeted the
open-market securities fraud class action under Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 as an
unjustified aspect of the securities regime. In a fraud action under Rule 10b-5,
plaintiffs can recover damages whenever a corporation’s stock price drops due to
false or misleading disclosures by the issuer or its executives (Basic Inc. v. Levinson
1988). Critics charge that the astronomical amount of potential damages creates
skewed incentives for plaintiff attorneys who file speculative suits on a contingent
basis in the hope of securing a quick and lucrative settlement (U.S. House of
Representatives 1995).
According to these critics, private attorneys function as public policemen but
they are free from effective discipline or oversight mechanisms to prevent them
from advancing their own interests at the expense of the plaintiff class. In response
to concerns about the plaintiff bar’s extortionary power, Congress adopted the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). Among other reforms,
the PSLRA created heightened pleading standards for Rule 10b-5 claims, stayed
discovery pending a defendant’s motion to dismiss, and replaced a system of joint
and several liability with a proportionate liability regime for most unknowing
violations of the securities laws.
The PSLRA increased the costs of shareholder suits while reducing the chances
that such claims would survive a preliminary motion. Coffee (2002) and Cunning-
ham (2003) suggest that by discouraging securities lawsuits and reducing litigation
risks, the PSLRA may have contributed to a business environment in which fraud
could thrive unchecked. Scholars have attempted to assess the impact of the PSLRA
on securities filing and settlement trends. Choi’s (2007) study concludes that the
statute not only has deterred frivolous claims (as intended), but also has discour-
aged lawyers from filing meritorious claims. Johnson, Pritchard, and Nelson (2006)
reach a similar conclusion.
SEC Enforcement
Some critics of the shareholder litigation regime assert that limiting private law-
suits is justified in light of the SEC’s ability to enforce the securities laws. They
assert that the SEC’s public mission and its political accountability make it a more
trustworthy advocate for shareholder interests than the private plaintiffs’ bar. SEC
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enforcement efforts can deter fraud through monetary penalties, disgorgement,
and other sanctions. The SEC also has power to compensate investors through
Sarbanes-Oxley’s “FAIR funds” provision, which allows the SEC to return penalties
collected from defendants to shareholders harmed by their fraud (Sarbanes-Oxley
2002, § 108).
Although some view the SEC as the most appropriate agent for vindicating
shareholder interests, the effectiveness of SEC enforcement has been seriously
questioned (Poser 2009; Fisch 2009). Macey (1994) and Pritchard (2005), among
others, have long charged that the SEC is subject to industry capture, such that it
affords powerful business interests with high-priced legal representation advan-
tages that are not available to ordinary citizens. There is some evidence to support
this capture perspective. For example, Cox and Thomas (2003 and 2009) find that
the SEC concentrates its enforcement efforts on smaller companies and typically
allows larger firms to settle claims by paying small fines and agreeing to minor
sanctions.
A recent report by the SEC’s Inspector General (SEC 2008a) lends further sup-
port to the capture paradigm. The Inspector General found that lawyers at a large
New York law firm enjoyed special access to senior SEC enforcement staff and
awareness of such access may have impeded the progress of an ongoing inves-
tigation against a senior Wall Street official. Moreover, Jones (2004) and Macey
(2004) note that the SEC lagged behind state regulators in high-profile investi-
gations involving investment analyst conflicts, mutual fund market timing, and,
more recently, abuses in marketing auction rate securities to investors.
Despite these shortcomings in the agency’s enforcement program, many schol-
ars including Seligman (2003), Langevoort (2006), and Prentice (2006) reject the cap-
ture narrative. Instead, these scholars view the SEC as an institution that balances
competing interests of investors, issuers, and financial intermediaries rather than
serving a monolithic corporate interest. Although the capture scenario is likely too
simplistic, recent history suggests that the SEC is a less than perfect enforcer of the
securities laws.
Another difficulty with relying exclusively on public enforcement of the se-
curities laws is the concern that the SEC has not been sufficiently aggressive
in pursuing corporate fraud. In the post-Enron era, the SEC became more ag-
gressive in its enforcement practices, but retreated dramatically under Chairman
Christopher Cox’s leadership. In a recent report, the U.S. Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) (2009) noted that the aggregate amount of SEC penalties fell
from $1.59 billion in 2005 (the beginning of Chairman Cox’s term) to $256 million
in 2008.
Many suspect that new SEC policies contributed to this decline. In 2006, the
Commission adopted a policy that seemed to question the appropriateness of
corporate-level penalties. Then in 2007, the SEC initiated a “Pilot Program” requir-
ing enforcement staff to consult with the Commission before engaging in settlement
discussions with corporate counsel (Nagy, Painter, and Sachs 2008). The GAO con-
cluded that these policies and practices caused the enforcement staff to retreat in
its pursuit of corporate penalties due to the Commission’s unwillingness to accept
staff recommendations on sanctions. SEC chair Mary Schapiro announced the end
of the Pilot Program in 2009, and pledged to work to address enforcement staff
concerns about their autonomy and authority (Schapiro 2009a and 2009b).
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Criminal Enforcement
In addition to civil enforcement by private citizens and the SEC, the U.S. Justice
Department pursues criminal violations of the securities laws. High-profile frauds
at Enron and WorldCom led to criminal convictions of Kenneth Lay, Jeff Skilling,
and Bernard Ebbers. All of these men received long prison sentences for their roles
in their corporations’ frauds.
Other Sources of Corporate Governance
Other important sources of corporate governance standards are the U.S. stock
exchanges and nonbinding pronouncements developed by private entities. Stock
exchange listing standards cover such governance issues as director independence,
audit committee composition, shareholder voting in mergers, executive compen-
sation, brokers’ discretion to vote for their clients, and many other key areas of
corporate governance. These rules are subject to SEC approval and the agency can
amend exchange rules as it deems necessary and appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of the Exchange Act (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(c)).
Among the most influential privately generated governance standards are the
American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance (1994). The ALI
Principles offer directors and officers guidance in the conduct of corporate affairs
beyond what is provided by corporate law doctrine. Other important purveyors
of governance standards (sometimes called best practices) include the National
Association of Corporate Directors and the Business Roundtable.
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING
The federal securities laws provide significant discipline for corporate officers and
directors. The financial reporting system forms the backbone of this accountabil-
ity system. Under the 1934 Act, public corporations must file periodic reports
of financial results with the SEC. These reports include the annual report on
Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, and interim reports on Form 8-K
which must be filed upon the occurrence of specified material events.
Investors rely on the information in these reports to evaluate a company’s
business prospects and make investment decisions. Although investors value the
historical information included in SEC filings, they are much more interested in es-
timates of future performance from a firm’s management or professional analysts.
These forecasts and earnings estimates have a large impact on stock price, and
missed estimates (reporting actual earnings below analysts’ consensus estimate)
often lead to a sharp decline in stock price.
In addition to the required SEC filings, companies communicate with investors
on a more informal basis through press releases, speeches, and conference calls.
One purpose of these informal communications is to manage investors’ expecta-
tions with respect to future performance. Managers are keenly aware of the close
connection between earnings projections and stock price and seek to ensure that
financial analysts’ published estimates are reasonable in light of management’s
own internal projections. Achieving such harmony requires managers to commu-
nicate regularly with the financial analyst community.
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During the 1990s, SEC chair Arthur Levitt expressed concerns about the com-
mon practice in which financial officers would “whisper” earnings estimates to
analysts to ensure that published estimates were in line with reality (Levitt 2002).
To curtail this practice, the SEC adopted Regulation F-D, which prohibits selec-
tive disclosures to investment professionals. Under Regulation F-D, whenever a
company discloses material information to analysts or investors, it must simulta-
neously disclose the information to the public at large (SEC 2000).
Financial Reporting Standards
The securities laws grant the SEC authority to develop standards for financial
reporting. Since its inception, the agency has looked to private standards set-
ters to generate generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Through its
professional organization, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), the accounting profession played a leading role in establishing the GAAP
framework (Bratton 2007). Concerns with the potential distortions associated with
allowing the accounting profession to set accounting standards led the AICPA to
cede direct authority over GAAP to an independent body.
In 1973, acting with SEC support, the profession created the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB) to oversee GAAP. Until 2002, the FASB was
funded through the sales of publications and voluntary contributions from pub-
lic accounting firms. This funding arrangement proved problematic as the board
found it awkward to adopt accounting standards opposed by audit firms and their
clients while depending on those same firms for its operating funds (Nagy 2005).
With the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Congress quashed this arrangement by
requiring any standard setter designated by the SEC to be funded by fees collected
by the federal government from filing companies (Sarbanes-Oxley § 109).
Concerns with the FASB’s independence were more than theoretical. As Her-
witz and Barrett (2006) explain, the FASB proposed a number of controversial
accounting pronouncements during the 1990s that reporting companies resisted
because they prohibited the accounting treatments they preferred. The FASB’s ef-
forts to adopt new reporting standards for employee stock options are emblematic
of this tension.
In 1993, the FASB proposed rules to require companies to treat stock options as
a compensation expense rather than a charge to capital on the balance sheet. The
major audit firms and the high tech industry led private-sector opposition to this
standard. Critics argued the rule would unreasonably burden start-up firms that
relied on options to attract and retain management talent and appealed to the SEC
and Congress for support. At the behest of these advocates, several congressmen,
including Senator Joseph Lieberman, introduced bills to prevent the FASB from
adopting the standard (Levitt 2002). In response to this pressure, the FASB relented
and adopted FAS 123 which encouraged, but did not require, companies to expense
options. Similar controversies surrounded FASB pronouncements on treatment
of derivatives and off-balance-sheet financing (Herwitz and Barrett 2001; Mark
2007). As with option expensing, industry groups and auditors were vocal in their
opposition to these measures and sought to use their influence in Congress to defeat
them. In all of these areas, the FASB ultimately adopted its proposed accounting
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treatments but only after prolonged conflict and delays (Herwitz and Barrett 2006;
Mark 2007).
The Globalization of Financial Reporting Standards
Although GAAP has long been the standard for financial reporting for U.S. com-
panies, its continued standing is open to question due to the widely perceived
need to achieve convergence among competing accounting standards around the
globe. Convergence proponents assert that uniformity in international financial
accounting standards would broaden access to capital across borders and facili-
tate investors’ ability to compare corporations from different countries, expanding
their array of investment opportunities (Takor 2005).
Convergence efforts have focused primarily on encouraging countries to adopt
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), established by the Interna-
tional Accounting Standard Board (IASB), as the standard for financial reporting.
Efforts to promote IFRS have been fairly successful and IFRS now governs in more
than 100 nations and in the European Union. A second objective of convergence
advocates is to reduce or eliminate differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. The
FASB and the SEC have engaged with their foreign counterparts in these efforts.
Under the Norwalk Agreement reached in 2002, the FASB and the IASB agreed
to work to achieve compatibility among their respective accounting standards
(Hanson 2006).
In 2007, the SEC embraced the convergence objective and moved to recognize
IFRS for foreign issuers filing financial statements with the SEC, without reconcil-
iation to U.S. GAAP (SEC 2007). The SEC took this step to reduce impediments to
foreign issuers listing their securities on U.S. stock exchanges. In August 2008, the
SEC went further and released a “road map” that proposed shifting the financial
reporting standard for U.S. companies from GAAP to IFRS (SEC 2008b). The road
map envisioned optional IFRS reporting for large issuers beginning in December
2009, with a transition to mandatory IFRS reporting for all issuers by 2014 (an ear-
lier proposal had considered allowing optional IFRS reporting without an eventual
mandate).
The proposed shift from GAAP to IFRS reflects a broader campaign to jettison
a reporting system with rigorous, complex rules in favor of a principles-based
system that would be more palatable to those who prepare financial statements. In
the standard critique, GAAP’s rules-based regime is maligned for being formulaic,
complex, difficult to interpret, and easy to evade (formal compliance while evading
the purpose of the rule). In contrast, IFRS’s principles-based regime is deemed to be
more flexible, substantively meaningful, and easier to apply (Cunningham 2008a).
Cunningham (2008a), Cox (2009), and Bratton and Cunningham (2009) have
expressed skepticism regarding the SEC’s haste to embrace IFRS. They point to
gaps in expertise, conversion costs, and substantial treatment differences between
GAAP and IFRS as reasons to tread cautiously on the march toward globalization.
With the change in the presidential administration, the U.S. shift to IFRS is again
in doubt. SEC chair Mary Schapiro is reevaluating the proposal. Schapiro has
acknowledged critics’ concerns with the road map’s timetable and conversion
costs. In the meantime, the FASB and the IASB continue to focus on convergence,
seeking greater compatibility pending consensus on global accounting standards.
P1: OTA/XYZ P2: ABC
c28 JWBT314-Baker July 10, 2010 18:1 Printer Name: Yet to Come
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 567
The Problem of Accounting Fraud
The SEC’s financial reporting system and the accompanying liability threat form
an important component of the corporate governance accountability system. The
financial reporting regime creates at least two sources of discipline for managers.
For companies that regularly access capital markets, reported financial results
directly affect their ability to raise capital as well as the cost of capital. Therefore,
managers are motivated to run their companies effectively so as to assure continued
access to low-cost capital. In addition, many companies use equity to finance
acquisitions. A higher stock price means that equity will go further in support of a
company’s acquisition strategy.
The financial reporting regime remains an important disciplinary device for
companies that do not rely on capital market financing. For most corporations,
executive compensation is linked closely with reported financial results, which
means that managers of companies that report higher earnings can expect to earn
more. These compensation schemes are designed to encourage managers to lead
their companies in a manner that achieves earnings growth over the long term.
Management’s Role
The effectiveness of financial reporting as a disciplinary tool depends on the ac-
curacy and reliability of management’s financial reports. Management prepares a
company’s financial reports subject to the oversight of the directors and an audit
by a public accounting firm. Management’s control over financial reporting creates
a basic conundrum for our corporate governance system.
Managers face strong incentives to manipulate financial reports in order to
present as rosy a picture as possible of a company’s financial condition. In general,
managers aim to present an impression of steady and predictable earnings growth
over a sustained time period. However, the reality of a firm’s financial performance
rarely jibes with the smooth and steady growth profile most managers hope to
achieve. This divergence between ideal financial results and the inevitable ups and
downs of business performance can lead managers to smooth reported earnings
(Levitt 1998).
Scholars describe income smoothing, or earnings management, as the practice of
using discretionary accounting judgments to shape the level of reported earnings
to meet management objectives or analyst expectations (Erickson, Hanlon, and
Maydew 2006; Lev 2003). Managers can also manage earnings through manipula-
tion of discretionary expenditures or purchases such as research and development
or capital improvements (Cunningham 2008b). This form of earnings management,
often termed real earnings management, may be objectionable, but it is legal.
Incentives to manage earnings intensify when the compensation of high-level
executives is directly linked to a company’s stock price. Stock option grants are the
most common method that corporations use to align executive and shareholder
interests. Stock options give executives the right to purchase company stock at the
current price at some point in the future. As a company’s stock price increases,
options become more valuable. Thus, option grants create incentives to manage
the company so that earnings and stock prices rise in a reliable fashion.
While stock options likely provide incentives for hard work and effective man-
agement, they also create incentives to manipulate reported earnings. Numerous
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studies have sought to establish a link between equity-based incentive pay and
accounting fraud. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Elayan, Li, and Meyer (2008),
and Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, and Khanin (2008) all find a positive correlation
between earnings management and high levels of equity compensation. A study
by Baker, Collins, and Reitenga (2003) suggests that managers are more likely to
engage in earnings management when their total compensation depends heav-
ily on financial performance, as through stock options. Johnson, Ryan, and Tian
(2008) report that these effects are most pronounced when compensation consists
of vested options or unrestricted stock, when managers would feel the effect of a
drop in stock price most acutely.
In contrast, studies by Erickson et al. (2006) and Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and
Larcker (2009) fail to demonstrate a conclusive link between compensation prac-
tices and accounting fraud. Laux and Laux (2009) theorize that one explanation
for the lack of clarity on this issue is that although lucrative equity compensation
increases incentives to manipulate earnings, it may also increase the audit com-
mittee’s scrutiny of financial reporting, thereby reducing opportunities for fraud.
A study by Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) on governance and earnings
management at bank holding companies lends support to this contention.
The Auditor’s Role
A corporation’s directors and its auditors form the front line for protecting investors
and the public from management fraud in financial reporting. Although directors
have oversight over a company’s financial reports, they rely chiefly on auditors to
assure that these reports are prepared in accordance with GAAP and fairly reflect
the company’s financial condition.
The securities laws require an independent audit of annual financial statements
filed with the SEC. The purpose of the audit is to provide some assurance to those
who use financial statements that management’s assertions have a reasonable basis
in fact. The audit firm seeks to verify enough of the information contained in the
financial reports so that it can reasonably conclude that the company prepared
these reports in accordance with GAAP.
During the 1990s, evidence began to mount that auditors were insufficiently
rigorous in their review of corporate financial statements. Between 1997 and
2002, 10 percent of all listed companies restated their financial reports, indicat-
ing widespread audit failures (Klein and Coffee 2004). The number of SEC fraud
enforcement actions also rose dramatically in this period (Beasley, Carcello, and
Hermanson 1999). After a series of major audit failures, including at Enron and
WorldCom, public officials grew wary of the auditing profession’s ability to main-
tain proper auditing standards and oversee its members’ compliance with such
standards.
With SOX, Congress set out to overhaul the financial reporting process and
reallocate responsibilities for establishing audit procedures and for the oversight
of auditors. The centerpiece of the legislation was the creation of the Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a new private nonprofit entity to
oversee the accounting industry (Nagy 2005). SOX gave the PCAOB authority to
establish generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), stripping the AICPA of its
traditional role. Congress also charged the PCAOB with maintaining standards for
auditor independence and conducting inspections of audit firms on a regular basis.
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The PCAOB first recognized extant GAAS on an interim basis. It also acted
quickly to adopt standards for the audit of internal control procedures prescribed
by SOX Section 404. Section 404 requires managers to annually assess and report
on the quality and effectiveness of their firms’ internal controls and requires the
independent auditor to attest to management’s report. Perhaps the most contro-
versial provision of SOX, Section 404 imposed new costs on public companies.
Critics maintain this provision has encouraged public companies to go private and
has discouraged foreign listings on U.S. stock exchanges (Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation 2006).
Assessing the costs and benefits of Section 404 is a challenging task. In a review
of the empirical literature on Section 404’s impact, Prentice (2007) concludes that the
provision’s costs have been exaggerated and that its benefits, while real, are hard
to quantify. According to Prentice, estimates of the average Section 404 compliance
costs in the initial implementation year were about $4 million per issuer. However,
a major portion of these costs are properly attributed to improvements in internal
controls that firms needed but had deferred. The initial costs also included signifi-
cant nonrecurring ramp-up costs. After initial implementation, Section 404 compli-
ance costs declined 40 percent for large companies and 30 percent for smaller firms.
Prentice (2007) concludes that the empirical literature supports the view that
Section 404 has proffered concrete benefits by restoring investor confidence, con-
tributing to better-quality financial reporting, and likely decreasing the incidence
of fraud. First, SOX helped fuel a market recovery by restoring investor confidence
in management’s financial reports (Benoit 2006). Further, studies by Bedard (2006),
Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2007), and Li, Rupley, and Johnstone (2009) suggest that
Section 404 has improved the quality of financial reporting, reducing the incidence
of abnormal accruals and restatements.
Finally, studies by DeFranco, Guan, and Lu (2005) and Doyle et al. (2007)
show that companies reporting internal control deficiencies under Section 404
saw declines in their stock price. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond
(2009) show that after companies corrected reported deficiencies, their costs of
capital declined. These studies suggest that the internal control audit conveys
useful information to investors and improves the allocational efficiency of markets.
Still, many critics complain that the costs of Section 404 exceed its benefits, es-
pecially for small companies that lack economies of scale. Some argue for a Section
404 exemption for smaller firms (Butler and Ribstein 2006; Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation 2006). A special SEC Advisory Committee (SEC 2006) recom-
mended that the agency exempt smaller companies from Section 404 compliance.
Thus far, the SEC has deferred the Section 404 compliance date for smaller com-
panies multiple times, but has declined to provide a complete exemption from its
requirements. In the absence of further delays, all companies must be fully com-
pliant with Section 404 in their reports for the fiscal year ending on or after June
15, 2010 (SEC 2009).
The Audit Committee’s Role
In addition to strengthening oversight of auditors, SOX sought to encourage greater
director involvement in the financial reporting process. Congress looked to the au-
dit committee of the board of directors to help insure the integrity of management
financial reports. Section 301 of SOX instructed the SEC to require stock exchanges
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to adopt rules mandating that all members of the audit committee of listed compa-
nies be independent of management. Congress also called for increased accounting
expertise on the audit committee. Section 407 requires issuers to disclose if the au-
dit committee has at least one member who is a “financial expert.” If no member
of the audit committee is a financial expert, the issuer must disclose that fact and
explain why not. Finally, Congress sought to enhance the resources and authority
of the audit committee. SOX specifies that the audit committee (not management)
has the authority to hire and fire the auditors and that auditors must report directly
to the committee. SOX also makes clear that the audit committee can hire its own
experts with the corporation bearing any costs related to such consultations.
Congress apparently believed that increasing the audit committee’s indepen-
dence and assuring expertise would encourage directors to take a more active role
in the review of financial reports and oversight of the audit. Empirical research
suggests that enhanced director independence and expertise does have a positive
impact on the quality of financial reporting (Cunningham 2008b). Carcello and
Neal (2000), Klein (2002), and Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) all report that
the presence of independent directors and financial experts on audit committees
appears to improve the quality of a firm’s financial reporting.
Further research has shown a greater benefit from accounting expertise than
from either independence or general financial expertise (Abbott, Parker, and
Peters 2004; Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi 2006). Thus, directors with experience
preparing or auditing financial statements seem to contribute most significantly to
constraining earnings management and other forms of financial fraud (Cunning-
ham 2008b).
PROSPECTIVE REFORMS
The SOX provisions reviewed in this chapter are a stark example of Congress’s
direct regulation of corporate conduct, which disrupted the traditional under-
standing of the federal role in corporate governance (Bainbridge 2006). With Sec-
tion 404, new audit committee rules, and other governance provisions, Congress
delved deeply into the details of how management and the board conduct their
affairs. SOX has also laid the groundwork for more intensive federal engagement
in corporate governance.
The 2008 financial collapse and subsequent government bailouts have created
an even more direct federal role in the oversight of major corporations. Massive
federal funding of private corporations sets new precedents and raises important
questions about government’s role in business. Importantly, the bailouts shift the
terms of the governance debate, as corporate law can no longer be viewed purely
as a matter of balancing private interests.
Against the backdrop of the federal government as a partner in private enter-
prise, a new wave of regulatory reform looms on the horizon. President Barack
Obama’s financial reform proposals include enhanced federal oversight of system-
ically significant financial firms and a new financial regulator to focus on consumer
protection. The President has also proposed legislation to provide for the regula-
tion of hedge funds and derivatives, as well as measures to enhance shareholder
power over executive compensation and the selection of directors.
Amidst calls for regulatory overhaul, the continued viability and authority
of the SEC hangs in the balance. The SEC’s reputation has suffered severely in
P1: OTA/XYZ P2: ABC
c28 JWBT314-Baker July 10, 2010 18:1 Printer Name: Yet to Come
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 571
the wake of the 2008–2009 financial crisis (Coffee and Sale 2009; Fisch 2009; Poser
2009). The agency’s passivity during the collapse of Bear Stearns, its failure to detect
Bernard Madoff’s massive fraud, and the failure of the Consolidated Supervised
Entity program for financial conglomerates have led to serious questions about the
agency’s competence and relevance.
Despite these recent missteps, sober analysis suggests that the SEC needs to
be strengthened rather than weakened in response to recent crises. The SEC’s rule-
making authority and political independence equip it to respond more deftly to
emerging problems than either Congress or the courts. The SEC’s recent failures can
be attributed in part to the erosion of its independence and authority at the hands of
Congress and the courts (Jones 2009). Budgetary threats and adverse federal court
decisions delayed or thwarted SEC initiatives to increase oversight of financial
firms, hedge funds, mutual funds, and auditors. Perhaps more importantly, the
SEC was led most recently by a chairman who appeared less than committed to the
agency’s mission (Scannell and Craig 2008). The regulatory dormancy engendered
by his approach allowed problems in the financial markets to fester and worsen,
eventually requiring urgent intervention by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.
If the agency can be reconstituted under competent leadership and its proper
authority restored, the SEC can be expected to reprise its role as the bastion of
investor protection that it has been during most of the past 75 years.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The structure of the U.S. corporate governance system has remained fairly stable
since the time of the New Deal. The SEC has overseen a regulatory system that
relies heavily on financial disclosure requirements to motivate responsible con-
duct by corporate officials. These rules are backed by a severe liability threat that
encourages full and fair disclosure to shareholders and the public.
Congress has generally ceded specific conduct standards to the states, which
developed common law fiduciary duties to govern the conduct of corporate of-
ficials. Over time the rigor of state regulation dissipated and the erosion of the
fiduciary duty doctrine compelled Congress and the SEC to engage more directly
in corporate governance issues, leading to SOX and likely more substantive gov-
ernance reforms in the future.
Overall, the U.S. corporate governance system is sound in design but problems
with enforcement, at both the state and federal level, mean that the performance of
corporate executives and directors does not reflect the lofty standards embodied
within state and federal law. The best hope for responsible management seems to
be the broad inculcation of proper moral standards in the individuals who run our
corporations. How the law can play a role in that endeavor is a question that has
confounded corporate law and criminal law theorists for decades.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Why do state courts generally defer to management’s business judgment? What
might be some dangers of imposing liability for breach of fiduciary duty more
frequently?
2. If the SEC recognizes IFRS for U.S. issuers, the IASB, a foreign nongovernmental
organization, would have authority over U.S. accounting standards. Is such
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an arrangement consistent with SOX’s requirement for a government-funded
accounting standards setter? (See Sarbanes-Oxley § 109.) Does ceding power
over U.S. accounting standards to a foreign body create accountability problems?
How might such issues be resolved?
3. Numerous studies cited in the chapter support the view that incentive compen-
sation contributes to financial fraud. Assuming this connection is well founded,
how should compensation practices at public corporations be reformed?
4. The topics reviewed in the chapter suggest that each of the accountability mech-
anisms relied on for corporate governance is flawed in some way. What appear
to be the most pressing problems in corporate governance? What are possible
reforms to increase the accountability of corporate managers?
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